

The Public Choice Approach To Politics Economists Of The Twentieth Century

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The Economics of Politics Gordon Tullock 2005 The Economics of Politics is the fourth volume in Liberty Fund's The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock. This volume includes some of Gordon Tullock's most noteworthy contributions to the theory and application of public choice, which is a relatively new science that links economics and political action. This volume combines the best parts of two of his books, *Private Wants: Public Means and On Voting*, as well as his famous monograph *The Vote Motive*. The common thread of The Economics of Politics is the importance of the bond between *Homo politicus* and *Homo economicus*: they are the same species, each driven largely by self-interest in vigorous pursuit of such personal objectives as wealth, power, prestige, and income security within the confines of society. The Economics of Politics covers such diverse public choice topics as: the nature and origins of public choice, the power of using economic analysis to understand and predict the behavior of politically influenced markets, and an evaluation of voting rules and political institutions. Equally confident in both the normative and the positive branches of the discipline, and well-versed in the wide variety of institutions and practices of democracy throughout history, Tullock takes the reader on a journey that goes well beyond the conventional horizon of public choice. Gordon Tullock is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Mason University, where he was Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Study of Public Choice and University Professor of Law and Economics. He also taught at the University of South Carolina, the University of Virginia, Rice University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the University of Arizona. In 1966 he founded the journal that became *Public Choice* and remained its editor until 1990. Charles K. Rowley was Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University and a Senior Fellow of the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy at George Mason University. He was also General Director of the Locke Institute.

Inspiring Economics Bruno S. Frey 2002-01-01 I highly recommend this book to all economists. It is well written, informative and a pleasure to read. The first chapter, in particular, "Inspiring, Dismal or Boring Economics?" should be made required reading for all graduate students in economics, and even more so for their professors, especially at leading universities in the United States. Yew-Kwang Ng, *Journal of Economic Literature* Instead of ignoring the challenge to rational behaviour posed by several anomalies in behaviour, or abandoning rationality in the face of this challenge, Bruno Frey's *Inspiring Economics* provides a valuable extension of rational behaviour to incorporate these anomalies. This is an exhilarating study that I strongly recommend to everyone, including those like myself, who believe that the importance of these anomalies are sometimes exaggerated. Gary S. Becker, Stanford University, US Bruno Frey is one of a number of modern economists who believe (as I do) that economics should be importing rather than exporting ideas from elsewhere in the social sciences. In these sparkling essays, he shows that rational choice theory is enriched and sometimes revised by taking account of non-monetary rewards and incentives. With Frey, economics once again becomes an inspiring behavioural science. Mark Blaug, University of London and University of Buckingham, UK Economics can be inspiring often taking a stand against convention, achieving challenging results, discussing unorthodox viewpoints and suggesting new policies. Bruno S. Frey illustrates what he perceives to be the inspirational quality of economics and how this differs from the type of economics studied in many academic institutions. He introduces insights into economics from a psychological perspective, dealing with issues such as transformation of anomalies, identification in democracy and crowding effects, and focuses on intrinsic motivation and how it is undermined. *Inspiring Economics* also looks at the integration of economics and politics, covering topics including popular initiatives and referenda, authoritarian nations and foreign aid, and the way in which the cost of war is reflected on the capital market. This groundbreaking empirical study of human motivation and behaviour will be a fascinating read for those interested in economics and economic theory.

The Limits of Public Choice Lars Udehn 2002-09-11 Public choice has been one of the most important developments in the social sciences in the last twenty years. However there are many people who are frustrated by the uncritical importing of ideas from economics into political science. *Public Choice* uses both empirical evidence and theoretical analysis to argue that the economic theory of politics is limited in scope and fertility. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of political life, political scientists must learn from both economists and sociologists.

Economics: Private and Public Choice James D. Gwartney 2014-02-04 **ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE**, Fifteenth Edition, reflects current economic conditions, enabling students to apply economic concepts to the world around them. The up-to-date text includes analysis and explanation of measures of economic activity in today's market. It also includes highlights of the recession of 2008-2009, and an in-depth look at the lives and contributions of notable economists. **ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE** dispels common economic myths. The text uses the invisible hand metaphor to explain economic theory, demonstrating how it works to stimulate the economy. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version.

Government By The Market? Peter Self 1993-11-24 An account of "public choice" theories, and examines their influence upon government policies in English-speaking countries. Issues covered include slimming the state, privatizing welfare and restructuring government. Final chapters offer an alternative view of the basis of good government.

Democracy and Welfare Economics Hans van den Doel 1993-07-22 This book is a fully revised and updated version of Hans van den Doel's *Democracy and Welfare Economics*. It presents the economic theory of political decision-making (otherwise known as new political economy, or public choice), providing students with an accessible and clear introduction to this important subject. The authors identify four different methods of decision-making by which the political process transforms the demands of individual citizens into government policy, and these are analyzed in turn with reference to economic theory.

Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie Anthony Downs 1993-12 English summary: It was Anthony Downs' objective to create a model dealing with voter and government behavior. In order to do so, he established goals which governments, parties and lobbyists as well as the voters can pursue. To motivate all those concerned, he introduced the self-interest axiom and called for rationality in order to attain these goals. With the help of marginal analysis, each voter determines his/her party differential, which will help to determine each voter's choice at the ballot box and to decide which party's rule will give him/her greater utility in the future. Downs describes how crucial the concept of ideology is to his theory. He maintains that a two-party democracy could not provide stable and effective government unless there is a large measure of ideological consensus amongst its citizens, and that political parties encouraged voters to be irrational by remaining vague and ambiguous. German description: Anthony Downs' inzwischen klassisches Demokratie-Modell des Wähler- und Regierungsverhaltens orientiert sich an der ökonomischen Theorie. Er nimmt an, dass politische Parteien und Wähler in der Verfolgung bestimmter, deutlich spezifizierter Ziele optimal handeln. So treffen die Wähler unter Ungewissheit über den Wahlvorgang und die zukünftige Regierungsbildung ihre Wahl nach dem mutmasslichen Nutzen. Die Regierung versucht, mit Hilfe der Manipulation des Budgets ihre Wiederwahl zu erreichen. Ideologien der Parteien auf der einen Seite, Interessengruppen auf der anderen stellen den Wählern bzw. der Regierung Informationen zur rationalen Entscheidungsfindung zur Verfügung. Dabei wird deutlich, dass Mehrparteiensysteme und Verhältniswahlrecht jedes Wahl-Kalkül unlosbar werden lassen. Auf die weiteren Folgerungen für Demokratie-Forschung und -Verständnis geht Downs im letzten Teil seines Werkes ausführlich ein.

The Political Economy of International Organizations Roland Vaubel 2021-06-02 The idea for this volume was conceived by Frederick Praeger, founder of Westview Press, who asked Roland Vaubel if he would put together a collection of chapters on the public choice approach to the study of international organizations. Vaubel felt it would be useful to have a coeditor from the United States, and Thomas D. Willett enthusiastically agreed to take on these duties.

Rethinking Public Choice Richard E. Wagner 2022-09-28 Innovative in its approach, *Rethinking Public Choice* reviews the concept of public choice since the 1950s post war period and the application of economics to political practices and institutions, as well as its evolution in recent years attracting contributions from political science and philosophy. Examining the growing variety of theoretical orientations on the topic, such as entangled political economy and additive political economy, the book provides new analytical insights into combining the old and new to establish a more unified political economy. Richard Wagner expertly highlights the key issues an entangled economy can bring, including incomplete information and its constant evolution as it reflects ever changing public choice ideas. Wagner seeks to extend the reach of public choice by distinguishing the formal idea of rationality that has dominated public choice from the immensely varied practice of human action that opens up new directions for public choice. This insightful approach will prove an excellent resource for academics and scholars of economics and political science, as well as those within the field of public administration as it offers an excellent blend of all subjects.

Collected Papers on the Experimental Foundations of Economics and Political Science: Public economics, political processes, and policy applications Charles R. Plott 2001 *Public Economics, Political Processes and Policy Applications* brings together an impressive collection of Charles R. Plott's work in experimental economics. The papers in this volume represent the beginnings of Professor Plott's experimental research on public economics, public choice and political processes, which are the origin for experimental work in mechanism design and experimental testbeds. He addresses the problems related to committees and public choice institutions, and develops methodological foundations that were later exported to other areas of economics. In these groundbreaking experiments strategies for posing questions are developed. The fundamental principles that shape policy studies are discovered and refined. The volume goes on to apply the principles to the prediction of group choice using game theory and voting theory, the power of special institutions and processes to determine outcomes, and the concept of equilibrium and equilibration in decision processes. Finally, the papers reflect a maturing of the methodologies, devoting attention to their success in the area of institutional design in general and of policy in particular. With deep roots in problems related to policy analysis that are carried throughout the volume, *Public Economics, Political Processes and Policy Applications* will be a fascinating read for those with an interest in experimental economics, the methodology of economics, political theory, and political economy.

The Soul of Classical Political Economy Peter J Boettke 2020-11-23 James M. Buchanan, a prominent political economist of the 20th century and a Nobel laureate in economics, was a founding thinker of the public choice tradition and was instrumental in the reintroduction of politics into economic analysis. He was also an intellectual entrepreneur who developed new and innovative centers for research, graduate programs, and outlets for academic publication. Having taught at a variety of institutions, including the University of Tennessee, Florida State University, the University of Virginia, and Virginia Tech, he moved the Center for Study of Public Choice to George Mason University in 1983, where he remained for the rest of his academic career. After his passing in 2013, the Special Collections Research Center for the Mason University Libraries began to compile a formal archive, the James M. Buchanan Papers, documenting Buchanan's contributions to social science and his intellectual legacy. This volume, *The Soul of Classical Political Economy*: James M. Buchanan from the Archives, edited by Peter J. Boettke and Alain Marciano, provides a unique window into not only the man, the scholar, and the teacher, but also the fields of public choice and public economics that Buchanan advanced over his productive and esteemed career. The sections in this volume correspond to important themes for understanding Buchanan's views on political economy as a social philosophy. The editors illustrate Buchanan's views by using archival material-most of it original and previously unpublished-and offering context as a guide through the evolution of Buchanan's expansive scholarship that took place over

roughly seven decades and spanned the fields of philosophy, politics, and economics. This volume is essential reading for anyone interested in Buchanan's work, in public choice theory, and in the continuing study of political economy.

Public Choice Analyses of American Economic History Joshua Hall 2019-01-25 This book is the third installment in a series of volumes looking at episodes in American economic history from a public choice perspective. Each chapter discusses citizens, special interests, and government officials responding to economic incentives in both markets and politics. In doing so, the book provides fresh insights into important periods of American history, from the Rhode Island's 1788 Referendum on the U.S. Constitution and the political influence of women's clubs in the United States. The volume features economic historians such as Ruth Wallis Herndon, junior public choice scholars such as Jayme Lemke and Leo Krasnozhan, and political scientists such as Michael Faber. This volume will be useful for researchers and students interested in economics, history, political science, economic history, public choice, and political economy.

Economic Politics in the United States William R. Keech 2013-10-14 Employing macroeconomic performance as a lens to evaluate democratic institutions, the author uses models of political behavior that allow for opportunism on the part of public officials and shortsightedness on the part of voters to see if democratic institutions lead to inferior macroeconomic performance. We have learned more about how and why democracy can work well or badly in the years since the first edition was published. It was not previously apparent how much the good performance of democracy in the United States was contingent on informal rules and institutions of restraint that are not part of the definition of democracy. Since that first edition, the United States has experienced soaring indebtedness, unintended adverse consequences of housing policy, and massive problems in the financial system. Each of these was permitted or encouraged by the incentives of electoral politics and by limitations on government, the two essential features of democratic institutions.

Political Theory and Public Choice Anthony Downs 1998 This volume contains a selection of Anthony Downs' essays, written since the 1950s, on politics and political theory. The articles address such issues as democracy, public choice theory, rational political decision-making and political policy.

The Elgar Companion to Public Choice Michael Reksulak 2013-01-01 'This is a comprehensive set of essays on myriad facets of public choice by many of the leading contributors in the field. The coverage is excellent and the essays are terrific. I highly recommend this book for researchers and students.' - Todd Sandler, University of Texas at Dallas, US The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition brings together leading scholars in the field of political economy to introduce readers to the latest research in public choice. The Companion lays out a comprehensive history of the field and, in five additional parts, it explores public choice contributions to the study of the origins of the state, the organization of political activity, the analysis of decision-making in non-market institutions, the examination of tribal governance, and to modeling and predicting the behavior of international organizations and transnational terrorism. With broad and up-to-date coverage, this second edition will appeal to politicians and policymakers, academics and researchers in public and social choice and political science as well as graduate students in economics, political science and public administration.

Political Economics Torsten Persson 2002-01-25 What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions—the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science—Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.

Economics of Public Choice Robert David Leiter 1975

The Political Economy of Environmental Policy Bouwe R. Dijkstra 1999 This work asks why market instruments have not been used to their full potential in environmental policy. It uses a public choice perspective to analyse the political economy of environmental policy, emphasising the role of interest groups which have blocked the introduction of market instruments.

The Production and Diffusion of Public Choice Political Economy Joseph C. Pitt 2004-01-26 This book is about its more than a subdiscipline within the field of economics—it is about a new field named "public choice political economy" that gradually evolved during the 1970s and 1980s at Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, Virginia. What is the field Public Choice Political Economy all about? How did it originate? Who were the main architects and builders? What values and work habits motivated the work? Finally, how did the facts about the development of public choice political economy stack up against what we know about science in general and how it has developed? The authors of the essays included in this volume, originally came together in May of 2000 in Blacksburg to celebrate their scientific achievements and take pride in the regimen of research and the processes that brewed at the legendary Public Choice center in Virginia. This location provided what turned out to be a fortuitous combination of obscurity and rustic quiet for original thoughts and concentrated debates. Inspired by the pioneer attitudes of the Virginians and the dedication and work ethic of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, a core group of renegade social scientists broke new ground and started a revolution in thought. The big questions about economizing behavior, constitutional limitations on an overreaching bureaucracy and the possible design and redesign of institutions to harness self-interested behavior for the benefit of all are touched on and placed in historical context. The resulting public choice movement occurred first in economics and later extended to political science and beyond. This may have been one of the most important developments in twentieth century social science. The book concludes with Nobel laureate, James Buchanan's thoughts about what had transpired largely but not exclusively under his guidance. Other contributors include, Richard B. McKenzie, Geoffrey Brennan, Stephen Medema and Robert Sugden. Professors Pitt, Salehi-Isfahani and Eckel provide a useful introduction to this collection. These essays and comments were originally published in *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* in January of 2004 as an "invited volume." The book should be of great interest to historians of economics and the social sciences.

James M. Buchanan Richard E. Wagner 2019-06-25 "A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan's many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory." - Bruce Caldwell, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA "The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book." - Mario Rizzo, Professor of Economics, New York University, USA This book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986. Buchanan's receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to use logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarly community. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan's scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy. This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan's scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan's scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past.

Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics James M. Buchanan 2002 This book contains a range of essays on topics in the emerging field of "constitutional political economy". This field of enquiry is strongly associated with the name of James M. Buchanan whose research program has been the point of departure for this field. The essays are a selection of those written by colleagues and researchers in the field to honor Buchanan on the occasion of his 80th birthday. They cover a wide range of topics but fall primarily into two sets: one set dealing with methodological aspects of the c.p.e. approach; the other dealing with specific applications in a variety of policy areas, ranging from "economic transformation" to monetary policy regimes to health care. One particular issue in the methodological area relates to the model of motivation used - and more especially, the role of "morality" in economic and political behavior. The five essays on this topic make up one of the sections of the book, and justify reference to the issue in the volume's title.

The Public Choice Approach to Politics Dennis C. Mueller 1993-01-01 'Dennis Mueller has played a significant part in the development of public choice, and this volume pays a fitting tribute to that contribution.' - Alan Hamlin, *The Economic Journal* The Public Choice Approach to Politics presents some of Dennis Mueller's most important contributions to public choice and public economics.

Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Gerald Gaus 2021-11-16 An updated and expanded edition of the classic introduction to PPE—philosophy, politics, and economics—coauthored by one of the field's pioneers Philosophy, Politics, and Economics offers a complete introduction to the fundamental tools and concepts of analysis that PPE students need to study social and political issues. This fully updated and expanded edition examines the core methodologies of rational choice, strategic analysis, norms, and collective choice that serve as the bedrocks of political philosophy and the social sciences. The textbook is ideal for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and nonspecialists looking to familiarize themselves with PPE's approaches. Starting with individual choice, the book develops an account of rationality to introduce readers to decision theory, utility theory, and concepts of welfare economics and consumer choice theory. It moves to strategic choice in game theory to explore such issues as bargaining theory, repeated games, and evolutionary game theory. The text also considers how social norms can be understood, observed, and measured. Concluding chapters address collective choice, social choice theory and democracy, and public choice theory's connections to voters, representatives, and institutions. Rigorous and comprehensive, Philosophy, Politics, and Economics continues to be an essential text for this popular and burgeoning field. The only book that covers the entirety of PPE methods A rigorous, nontechnical introduction to decision theory, game theory, and positive political theory A philosophical introduction to rational choice theory in the social sciences

Greed, Chaos, and Governance Jerry L. Mashaw 1999-01-11 Public choice theory should be taken seriously—but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions. While Mashaw addresses perennial questions of constitutional law, legislative interpretation, administrative law, and the design of public institutions, he arrives at innovative conclusions. Countering the positions of key public choice theorists, Mashaw finds public choice approaches virtually useless as an aid to the interpretation of statutes, and he finds public choice arguments against delegating political decisions to administrators incoherent. But, using the tools of public choice analysts, he reverses the lawyers' conventional wisdom by arguing that substantive rationality review is not only legitimate but a lesser invasion of legislative prerogatives than much judicial interpretation of statutes. And, criticizing three decades of "law reform," Mashaw contends that pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules has seriously undermined both governmental capacity and the rule of law.

Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice Patrick Dunleavy 2014-06-03 First published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Rational Choice and Politics Stephen Parsons 2005-03-18 Rational Choice Theory claims to be able to explain how all individuals make not just some of their choices, but all of their choices, all of the time. According to the theory, there is no difference in principle between choosing whether to buy apples rather than bananas or choosing whether to join a political revolution instead of staying at home and watching television. Given these claims to universal applicability, it is perhaps not surprising to find that over the last three or four decades Rational Choice Theory has become increasingly influential as a means of providing explanations in politics. The textbook introduces the premises of Rational Choice Theory and illustrates how this theory can be applied to political studies. The book concludes with an assessment of the usefulness of the model in the light of the problems highlighted. "Parson's book provides a lucid presentation and a cogent critique of Rational Choice Theory in economics and politics." Professor Steve Pressman, Department of Economics and Finance, Monmouth University, USA

James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy Richard E. Wagner 2017-05-23 James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy: A Rational Reconstruction examines the contemporary meaning and significance of James M. Buchanan's body of work. The book uses Buchanan's past contributions to explore the present and future relevance of his scholarly contributions and insights. It seeks mainly to explain what insight their work contemporary scholars might acquire by becoming familiar with some of Buchanan's formulations. Buchanan was one of the most creative and prolific scholars of political economy during the post-war period. Not only was his body of work so immense that it could not be contained within 20 volumes of

Collected Works, but also Buchanan's scholarship made such strong contact with law, ethics, and political science that he could easily have served as a poster-child for the programs in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics which have been gaining momentum in recent years. Buchanan spoke for a style of economics that made wide and firm contact with the full range of the humane studies. This book emphasizes those features of Buchanan's thought that seem relevant for contemporary scholarship within the broadly liberal tradition of political economy.

Rational Choice Andrew Hindmoor 2017-09-16 Assuming no prior knowledge, this widely-used and critically-acclaimed text provides a clear introduction to, and uniquely fair-minded assessment of, Rational Choice approaches. The substantially revised, updated and extended new edition includes more substantial coverage of game theory, collective action, 'revisionist' public choice, and the use of rational choice in International Relations.

Choosing in Groups Melvin J. Hinich 2015-01-12 This book is an introduction to the logic and analytics of group choice. To understand how political institutions work, it is important to isolate what citizens - as individuals and as members of society - actually want. This book develops a means of "representing" the preferences of citizens so that institutions can be studied more carefully. This is the first book to integrate the classical problem of constitutions with modern spatial theory, connecting Aristotle and Montesquieu with Arrow and Buchanan.

The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit Trent J. Macdonald 2019-06-28 Territorial political organisation forms the backbone of western liberal democracies. However, political economists are increasingly aware of how this form of government neglects the preferences of citizens, resulting in dramatic conflicts. The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit explores the theoretical possibility of 'unbundling' government functions and decentralising territorial governance. Employing a variety of theoretical approaches, including new institutional economics, comparative analysis, public choice and Hayekian political economy, Trent J. Macdonald investigates the prospects of a government that separates its traditional functions and decentralises control to non-territorial jurisdictions. Following the history of political-economic thought, the author uncovers an extensive history of non-territorial governance, and provides insight into present-day examples. He emphasises the political mechanism of 'non-territorial secession' and the emerging phenomenon of 'cryptosecession' as the theoretical future of governance. Through an extension of the Coase theorem, this intricate book examines how political systems and jurisdictions change, developing a new theory of spontaneous order. A provocative and enlightening investigation of modern political organisation, Macdonald's vast study is an ideal theoretical guide for scholars and students of political economy. This book also contains critical ideas for policy-makers seeking guidance for the future of political organisation in an increasingly non-territorial world.

The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan James M. Buchanan 1999

The Theory of Public Choice—II James M. Buchanan 1984 Discusses voting, tax policy, government regulation, redistribution of wealth, and international negotiation in a new approach to government

Policy Analysis by Design Davis B. Bobrow 1987 Policy Analysis by Design examines the approaches to public policy taken by those who try to teach it, write about it, and influence it through major analysis. & Bobrow and Dryzek systematically compare the five major contending analytical frames of reference: welfare economics, public choice, social structure, information processing, and political philosophy. & The workings of each frame are illustrated by means of a common, if imaginary, policy case - air pollution in the hypothetical Smoke Valley.

Institutions and Collective Choice in Developing Countries Mwangi S. Kimenyi 2019-05-23 First published in 1999, this volume is written by seasoned public choice scholars and is intended to make a significant contribution to the debate on peaceful coexistence and sustainable development in developing countries. The book contains a rich mixture of analytical ideas and views on collective choice and macroeconomic performance in developing countries. This book breaks new ground in that it is the first comprehensive application of the theory of public choice to collective decision making in developing societies. It provides both students of Third World studies and policy makers in developing societies an in-depth analysis for institutions for collective choice. For countries undergoing major reform of their political and economic institutions, public choice theory can provide significant and useful insights, and help these societies design and adopt institutional arrangements that enhance peaceful coexistence of groups, the creation of wealth and sustainable development. Specifically, the book successfully shows that: (1) the application of economic theory to the study of public policy in the developing countries can provide important insights into collective decision-making; (2) the application of public choice theory to the study of developing societies can significantly improve the efficiency of bureaucratic and governmental systems, and consequently, promote economic, political and social development; and (3) public choice can help developing societies design and sustain effective laws and institutions for peaceful coexistence of groups and achieve sustainable development.

The Economics of Politics James M. Buchanan 1978

Social Policy in a Changing Society Maurice Mullard 1998 Provides an introduction to social policy by building a link between theory and policy. This book considers a range of interpretations of changes in society, politics and the economy, and assesses their implications for social welfare. Part One considers conventional models, including Keynesian thought, Marxism, liberalism, conservatism, social democracy and socialism. Part Two turns to new paradigms, including communitarianism, post-Fordism, globalization, postmodernity, the risk society, critical theory, Foucauldian thought and patriarchy. In Part Three, the authors review debates on social, economic and political change. The approach is mainly theoretical, with material drawn from sociology, political theory, economics and public and social administration.

Austrian Economics Steven Horwitz 2018-12-03 This book brings together emerging and established scholars to explore the insights that can be gleaned from applying Austrian economics to a range of different topics and a variety of related disciplines, from history to politics to public policy.

Rethinking Public Choice Wagner, Richard E. 2022-09-06 Innovative in its approach, Rethinking Public Choice reviews the concept of public choice since the 1950s post-war period and the application of economics to political practices and institutions, as well as its evolution in recent years attracting contributions from political science and philosophy.

The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy Barry R. Weingast 2008-06-20 Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had many different meanings: the science of managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; the study of how the ownership of the means of production influenced historical processes for Marx; the study of the inter-relationship between economics and politics for some twentieth-century commentators; and for others, a methodology emphasizing individual rationality (the economic or "public choice" approach) or institutional adaptation (the sociological version). This Handbook views political economy as a grand (if imperfect) synthesis of these various strands, treating political economy as the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and institutions. This Handbook surveys the field of political economy, with 58 chapters ranging from micro to macro, national to international, institutional to behavioral, methodological to substantive. Chapters on social choice, constitutional theory, and public economics are set alongside ones on voters, parties and pressure groups, macroeconomics and politics, capitalism and democracy, and international political economy and international conflict.

Law and Economics Nicholas Mercurio 2012-12-06 The character of economic life in a society is dependent upon, among 2 other things, its political-legal-economic institutional setting. Within that institutional structure, the individuals who comprise that society attempt to cooperate with one another to their mutual advantage so as to accommodate their joint utility-maximizing endeavors. In addition, these same individuals call upon certain societal institutions to adjust the conflicting claims of different individuals and groups. In this regard, a society is perceived as both a cooperative venture for mutual advantage where there are an identity of interests and, as well, an arena of conflict where there exists a mutual interdependence of conflicting claims or interests. The manner in which a society structures its political-legal-economic institutions 1) to enhance the scope of its cooperative endeavors and 2) to channel internal political-legal-economic conflicts toward resolution, shapes the character of economic life in that society. In contemplating the structure of its institutions intended to promote cooperation and channel conflict, a society confronts several issues. At the most general level an enduring issue is how a society both perceives and then ideologically transmits (perhaps teaches or rationalizes), internally and/or externally, its perceptions of so-called "cooperative endeavors" and "arenas of conflict." There can be no doubt that the resultant structure of a society's institutions will reflect that society's perception as to what cooperation entails and what conflict constitutes.